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CASE NOTE
Trade Regulation—Antitrust Challenge to Stock Exchange's Prohibi-
tion Against Commission Sharing—Thill Securities Corp. v. New
York Stock Exch.'—The New York Stock Exchange is an unincorpo-
rated association consisting of individuals and allied firms whose
members transact the vast majority of the brokerage business in stocks
in the United States.' Article XV, Section 1 of the Exchange Consti-
tution provides that commissions paid to any member shall be "net and
free from any rebate, return, discount or allowance made in any shape
or manner, or by any method or arrangement, direct or indirect."
Thill Securities Corporation, a broker
-
dealer in securities and a non-
member of the Exchange, instituted a class action on behalf of the
firm and all others similarly situated, charging that in promulgating
and enforcing the anti-rebate provisions of Article XV the members
of the Exchange have engaged in a combination and conspiracy in
restraint of trade, and have monopolized the securities industry.' Thill
sought a declaratory judgment that the Exchange regulations violate
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 4 of the Clayton Act,
an injunction prohibiting their further enforcement, and $2 1 million
in treble damages for lost profits, plus counsel fees and expenses.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, the Exchange
urged that Section 19(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19345 im-
1 5 Trade Reg. Rep. if 72,911, at 86,468 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 26, 1969).
2 SEC, Report of the Special Study of the Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, 45 (1963). At the close of 1962 there were 1366 members of the
Exchange, of which 1101 were affiliated with 672 member firms, 259 were individual
members and 6 were inactive. To be considered a "member firm" at least one member
of the Exchange must be a general partner or a director holding voting stock. Id.
3 Id. at 302.
4 5 Trade Reg. Rep. § 72,911, at 87,468. The suit was brought under §§ 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964) and § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 15 (1964).
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides, in part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States . is declared to be
illegal . . . .
Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides in part:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor .. .
Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides in part:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any-
thing forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore . . . and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit including a reason-
able attorney's fee.
5 Section 19(b) reads in part:
The Commission is further authorized, if after making appropriate request in
writing to a national securities exchange that such exchange effect on its own
behalf specified changes in its rules and practices, and after appropriate notice
and opportunity for hearing, the Commission determines that such exchange
has not made the changes so requested, and that such changes are necessary
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poses a duty of self-regulation on the Exchange, subject to review by the
SEC. The Exchange also argued that this section impliedly authorizes
the Exchange to fix reasonable rates of commission, and that the
power to prohibit sharing of commissions between members and non-
members is an "integral and necessary" part of such authority. There-
fore, it was maintained that section 19 (b) immunizes this practice
from challenge under the antitrust laws. 6
On the Exchange's motion for summary judgment, HELD: The
Exchange prohibition against sharing commissions is merely one
method of regulating commissions, and is thus a valid exercise of its
self-regulating authority as conferred by Section 19(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934. In addition, the SEC is currently reviewing
the entire structure of commission rates, and such supervision con-
stitutes adequate review and control of the complained of activities. For
these reasons the prohibition against sharing commissions is immune
from attack under the antitrust laws.
The potential conflict between the antitrust laws and congres-
sional mandates to administrative agencies has already occasioned
many difficulties; barring congressional intervention these are likely
to continue.' Two previous cases, Silver v. New York Stock Exch. 8
and Kaplan v. Lehman Bros.," presented direct challenges to New
York Stock Exchange practices and required interpretation of the
relationship between the antitrust laws and the powers of the SEC.
In Thill the court was again confronted with a challenge to Ex-
change practices, and was again required to examine this relation-
ship. Although the court relied heavily on the language of Silver and
Kaplan, it is submitted that it in fact failed to follow the holding of
Silver, and erred in applying the holding of Kaplan to the facts pre-
sented.
In Silver a non-member broker-dealer alleged that his business
was damaged when, without notice to him, the Exchange directed the
removal of private wire and ticker services connecting his office to
or appropriate for the protection of investors or to insure fair dealing in securities
. by rules or regulations or by order to alter or supplement the rules of such
exchange .. • in respect of such matters as . (9) the fixing of reasonable rates
of commission, interest, listing, and other charges ....
15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1964).
6 5 Trade Reg. Rep. If 72,911, at 87,469.
7
 For a thorough discussion of this problem see Hale & Hale, Competition or Con-
trol I: The Chaos in the Cases, 106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 641 (1958); Hale & Hale, Compe-
tition or Control II: Radio and Television Broadcasting, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 585 (1959) ;
Hale & Hale, Competition or Control HI: Motor Carriers, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 775
(1960) ; Hale & Hale, Competition or Control IV: Air Carriers, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 311
(1961) ; Hale & Hale, Competition or Control V: Production and Distribution of Elec-
trical Energy, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 57 (1961); Hale & Hale, Competition or Control VI:
Application of Antitrust Laws to Regulated Industries, 111 U. Pa. L. Rev. 46 (1962),
Nerenberg, Applicability of the Antitrust Laws to the Securities Field, 16 Case W. Res.
L. Rev. 131 (1964).
8 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
9
 250 F. Supp. 562 (ND. Ill. 1966), aff'd, 371 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 954 (1967).
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those of several member firms. The plaintiff contended that both ser-
vices are necessary adjuncts to the successful operation of a broker-
age firm, and that the Exchange's action constituted a concerted re-
fusal to deal and was thus a per se violation of the antitrust laws. The
Supreme Court agreed that, absent authorization by federal legislation,
the activities complained of would constitute a per se violation of the
antitrust laws. In response to the defendants' argument that such
authorization is given in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the
Court stated that since " [t] he Securities Exchange Act contains no
express exemption from the antitrust laws," any repeal must be by im-
plication." Noting that repeals by implication are not favored, the
Court held that repeal of the antitrust laws "is to be regarded as
implied only if necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work,
and even then only to the minimum extent necessary."'
Applying this test to Silver's allegations, the Court noted that
Silver was not directly assailing an Exchange rule, but rather the man-
ner in which a particular rule had been enforced. While section 19(b)
gives the SEC power to review and make changes in Exchange rules,
it does not provide for SEC supervision of their enforcement. Thus, on
this issue the Court found no express conflict between the two Acts.
However, the existence of the SEC's reviewing powers, together with
the provisions of section 6(b)," which require that Exchanges have
rules for disciplining members, and section 6(d)," which permits
registration of only those Exchanges which have such rules, viewed
in light of the historical development of federal regulation of ex-
changes, indicate that Congress intended that exchanges provide
mechanisms for self-regulation." However, the Court found that where
such self-regulation involves practices which violate the antitrust laws,
the practices can be justified only if they can be shown to be "neces-
sary to protect the achievement of the aims of the Securities Exchange
Act." On the facts presented, the Court found that no possible justi-
fication could be advanced for failing to provide for notice and a fair
hearing prior to the removal of the wire services, and that therefore
the practices complained of were not immune from challenge under
the antitrust laws."
The Court's holding in Silver formed the basis for the decision in
Kaplan v. Lehman Bros.," in which mutual fund shareholders
brought suit against the New York Stock Exchange, four member
firms and several nominal mutual fund defendants, charging that by
setting minimum commission rates the members of the Exchange had
engaged in a conspiracy in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The district court recognized that, as in Silver, absent sanctions in the
10 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
1.1. Id.
12 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1964).
13 15 U.S.C. § 78f(d) (1964).
14 373 U.S. at 351-53.
15 Id. at 361.
15 250 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ill. 1966).
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Securities Exchange Act, the defendants' activities would constitute a
per se violation of the Sherman Act. In this case, however, the activity
complained of was not the manner in which a particular rule had been
enforced, but the promulgation of the rule itself. Since section 19 (b)
gives the SEC power to review exchange rules regarding "the fixing
of reasonable rates of commission," the district court reasoned that
Congress intended that securities exchanges should have the power
to make such rules. Furthermore, since the SEC is empowered to re-
view such rules "there is no need to resort to the antitrust laws for
a remedy."17
It has been suggested, however, that the decision in Kaplan was
not compelled by section 19(b). The Department of Justice has re-
mained adamant in its opposition to the Exchange's practice of setting
minimum rates, and has stated that " [t] he ruling in Kaplan, especially
in the absence of any plenary review by the Supreme Court, did not
foreclose the need for resolution of the application of Silver in this
context, in order to determine the scope of antitrust jurisdiction.'
It is in fact arguable that Congress, in passing section 19(b), never
contemplated the development of a set of fixed minimum commission
rates. In view of the implications for both consumers and the economy
in general, and the fact that from an antitrust standpoint an agreement
to set minimum prices is considered inherently unreasonable, legislative
clarification is needed.
In Kaplan the district court also found that the issue of the "rea-
sonableness" of commission rates should not be left to the courts, who
might disagree in their interpretations. The court observed that "[t]o
leave the determination of reasonableness to the prospective decisions
of the agency [SEC] which is especially qualified and responsible for
the general supervision of the industry will assure the intention of
Congress as well as the interests of the public,"" Apparently this
faith in the efficacy of the SEC was not shared by Chief Justice War-
ren, who dissented from the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in
Kaplan on the basis of the plaintiffs' allegations that the SEC's re-
viewing powers were purely discretionary, that previous SEC investi-
gations into rate increases were based solely on the limited statistics
provided by the Exchange, and that neither the SEC nor the Exchange
had formulated any standards in this area. 2°
17 Id. at 566.
18 Comments of the United States Department of Justice on SEC Securities Ex-
change Act Release No. 8239 (Jan. 26, 1968), reprinted in CCH, Selected Comments on
SEC Proposed Rule on Give-Ups and NYSE Proposal on Commission Rates, 18 n. 3
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Selected Comments].
10 250 F. Supp. at 566.
20 389 U.S. 954, 956-57 (1967). Chief Justice Warren observed:
The court below, in a two-page opinion, held that a repeal of the antitrust laws
was required to make the Securities Exchange Act work, and that "the self-
regulatory function of the exchange has been exercised by virtue of § 19(b)...."
In my view, this blunderbuss approach falls far short of the close analysis and
delicate weighing process mandated by this Court's opinion in Silver.
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In Silver, as noted above, the Court was concerned with the man-
ner in which a particular Exchange rule was applied. In Kaplan, on the
other hand, the plaintiff attacked the validity of an Exchange rule it-
self. Thill, which resembles Kaplan in that the plaintiff was making a
broad attack on the promulgation of an Exchange rule, differs from
Kaplan in that nowhere in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is the
SEC expressly given jurisdiction to review the allocation of commis-
sions between Exchange members and non-members. In addition, it
may be argued that section 19(b) does not impliedly authorize the
Exchange to promulgate such rules. However, the Thill court, citing
a phrase in the circuit court's opinion in Kaplan, asserted that the
prohibition against sharing commissions was " 'one method of regulat-
ing commission rates,' and therefore, like the Exchange practice of
establishing minimum commissions, is immune from the antitrust
laws."2 ' It is unfortunate that the Kaplan court phrased its conclusion
in such broad terms. Section 19(b) does not authorize exchanges to
regulate" all aspects of commission rates; at most, it authorizes the
fixing of the level of commissions charged. There is no suggestion
that in enacting section 19(b) Congress intended Exchanges to regu-
late the allocation of commissions once they are determined to be
"reasonable."
It is submitted, therefore, that there is no required repeal, ex-
press or implied, of the antitrust laws as applied to the prohibition on
commission sharing. Under the holding in Silver, therefore, the Ex-
change may continue to enforce the prohibition only if it can prove
that it is necessary in order to make the Securities Exchange Act work.
The Exchange did argue that the prohibition is an "integral" part of the
authority to fix commission rates, and the court apparently accepted
this view, but neither the court nor the Exchange has thus far articu-
lated any rationale supporting this position. Indeed, it is arguable
that no such rationale exists.
The predominant purpose of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
is found in the Act itself. In section 2 Congress indicated that it found
the securities markets "affected with a national public interest
which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control . . . to
insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets . . . " 22
 In section
6(d) the SEC is given authority to register exchanges when it finds
"that the rules of the exchange are just and adequate to insure fair
dealing and to protect investors . .. ." 23 In addition, section 19(b)
indicates that the SEC may intervene when action is necessary "for
the protection of investors or to insure fair dealing in securities . . . '324
Nowhere in the Act is there any indication that Congress contemplated
a restriction of competition between members and non-members; this
would appear to be in direct conflict with the aims of the Act.
21 5 'Dude Reg. Rep. 4 72,911, at 87,470, quoting Kaplan, 371 F.24:1 at 411.
22 15	 § 786 (1964).
23 15 U.S.C. § 78f(d) (1964).
24 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1964).
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In 1961 Congress directed the SEC "to make a study and investi-
gation of the adequacy, for the protection of investors, of the rules of
national securities exchanges and national securities associations ....'"5
The resulting 1963 Report of the Special Study of the Securities Mar-
kets" determined that, rather than effectuating the purposes of the
Exchange Act, the prohibition on fee sharing has caused great difficulty
for some brokers, and much confusion in the industry. The Special
Study indicated that a non-member broker must charge his customers
the same commission he must pay to the member who places the
order on the New York Stock Exchange; thus, the non-member not
only fails to make a profit on the transaction, but must absorb the
costs and overhead on other transactions. 27 Therefore, it is obvious
that the rates set by the Exchange determine commission rates for the
entire industry, to the detriment of the individual investors sought to
be protected by Congress. In addition, member firms, anxious to retain
the business and good will of non-member firms but prohibited from
sharing fees, develop complicated methods of reciprocating:
[The member firm] may place business on a regional ex-
change with a nonmember who is a member of that exchange
even though (a) the member is also a member of the regional
exchange (dual member) and could have placed the business
there directly or (b) the security is traded on the NYSE as
well as the regional exchange (dual listing) so that the dual
member could have effected the transaction directly on the
NYSE. [The member firm] may place orders for unlisted se-
curities with the nonmember to be transacted over the coun-
ter, even though the member firm may have a trading
department capable of effecting the transaction directly. This
reciprocal commission business is generally placed under
arrangements involving "reciprocal ratios" of 2 to 1, 3 to 1 or
similar ratios; that is, the NYSE member will direct $1 in
commissions to the nonmember for each $1.50, $2, or $3 of
commissions received. The ratio always favors the NYSE
member.'
The findings of the Special Study indicate that three undesirable
results flow from the Exchange prohibitions on commission sharing.
First, the complexity of the "reciprocal" practices cannot help but
create administrative and pricing difficulties, both of which tend to
work to the disadvantage of the investor. Secondly, smaller firms can-
not always utilize the services provided by member firms to non-mem-
ber firms in lieu of commissions. Thus, even among non-member firms,
25 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d) (1964).
26 SEC, Report of the Special Study of the Securities Markets, H. R. Doc. No. 95,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, 45 (1963).
27 Id. at 301 (footnotes omitted).
28 Id. at 302 (footnotes omitted). Members may also accomplish the same ob-jectives by furnishing non-members with office space, special research, displays, and
other services. Id. at 308.
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the larger are more likely to survive in the competition. The demise
of the small firm might eventually deny the small investor a market in
which to transact his business. Finally, the desire to place reciprocal
orders may prevent member firms from transacting their business "in
the best available market."' This last problem is perhaps the most
serious and is exactly what the Securities Exchange Act is designed
to prevent.
The arguments against the anti-rebate rule, combined with pres-
sure from government and other sources, seem to have impressed the
New York Stock Exchange itself. In a letter dated January 2, 1968,
the president of the Exchange stated that the board of governors had
adopted several proposals regarding the structure of commission rates,
including a "discount in the minimum commission schedule" for cer-
tain qualified non-member dealers.' Should this proposal be put into
effect, the Exchange's constitutional provisions prohibiting rebates
would probably be amended. It is thus evident that, contrary to the
Exchange's contention in Thill, the prohibition on commission sharing
is neither an "integral and necessary" element of the fixing of reason-
able rates of commission, nor an exercise of Exchange self-regulation
necessary to make the Exchange Act work. Thus, under the holding
in Silver, the promulgation of such rules is not immune to antitrust
attack.
The Thill court noted that the SEC is currently conducting hear-
ings on all aspects of the commission rate structure," and stated that
"such supervision constitutes more than adequate review and control
of the Exchange's practices." 32
 While the review being undertaken by
the SEC might have formed the basis for a denial of equitable relief,
it is irrelevant in an action for damages based on past conduct. In
addition, whatever its powers to effect changes in Exchange rules,
the SEC has no power to award damages. Assuming that the plaintiff's
allegations are true, the SEC's review can hardly be called an "ade-
quate" remedy:"
29
 Id. at 309-10.
ao Letter from Robert W. Haack, President of the New York Stock Exchange to
all members, Jan. 2, 1968, reprinted in Selected Comments 14-15. It has been sug-
gested that the discount be set at one-third of the commission rate. Letter from Robert
W. Haack to Manuel F. Cohen, SEC Chairman, June 27, 1968, reprinted in [1967-1969
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶1 77,585, at 83,229.
31 In January, 1968, the SEC published both its proposed Rule 10b-10, which
would prohibit investment companies or mutual fund managers from directing the
sharing of commissions on securities transactions unless the benefits of such sharing accrue to
the investment company, mutual fund or its shareholders, and the New York Stock
Exchange Proposals on Commission Rates. Because of certain conflicts between the two
proposals, the Commission announced that it would solicit the views of all interested
parties and conduct hearings before taking further action. Selected Comments 12-13.
These hearings are concerned with all aspects of the commission rate structure.
32 5 Trade Reg. Rep. If 72,911, at 87,471.
33
 It is entirely possible that the expensive and complicated system of "reciprocal
dealings" mentioned above would prevent Thill from proving its damages with the
degree of certainty required in suits under the Sherman Act. Judgments in antitrust
actions cannot be based on speculation, even though the defendant has, by his own wrong,
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In conclusion it is submitted that the court erred in following
the language of Kaplan rather than the holding in Silver. Section 19 (b)
of the Securities Exchange Act refers not to the "regulation" of com-
missions, but to the "fixing" of commissions. The Thill court's broad
reading of this section has extended its scope to encompass any activity
which the Exchange might argue facilitates its regulation of the struc-
ture of commission rates, and has done so in the absence of any clear
congressional intent to effectuate such a policy. In addition the Court
has failed to require, or at least to articulate, any justification for the
Exchange's policy. There is every indication that the primary objective
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was the protection of investors,
and that the Exchange's rules regarding the prohibition of commission
sharing have weakened this objective by creating an atmosphere in
which competition among dealers is stifled. In an area as complicated
and sensitive as the trading of securities, and as vital to the economy,
such an approach seems an unfortunate abdication of responsibility.
JUDITH K. WYMAN
precluded an exact determination of the damages. Bigelow v. RK0 Radio Pictures, 327
U.S. 251, 264 (1946) ; Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383, 392
(6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963) ; Associated Press v. Taft Ingalls
Corp., 340 F.2d 753, 769 (6th Cir. 1965). The fact that the plaintiff might experience
difficulty in proving damages should not preclude his having an opportunity to attempt it.
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